It is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means — must I not say the same of other people, too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?
- Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293
We can’t observe the mental states of others, but people can describe them to us. Given this, how can we bridge the gap between what a person says and what that person feels without doing what Wittgenstein cautions above — generalizing irresponsibly from our own, singular case?
Broadly, I study how we bridge this gap (and how we can do it better), not only as researchers trying to understand the mind, but as people trying to understand one another. More specifically, my work builds on methods and insights from classic work in sensory psychophysics, which I extend to deeper (and fuzzier) topics like morality, emotion, and intersubjectivity.
I’m currently working with Laurie Santos on methodological issues surrounding the measurement of happiness. In another life I was a freelance writer, contributing mostly to The Daily Beast, though I'm particularly proud of pieces I've had in The New Republic and The New York Times.